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MAP USE DURING AND AFTER HURRICANE ANDREW
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In South Florida, at 5 a.m. on the Monday morning of August 24, 1992, the 164 to 200+ mph
gusts of Andrew, a Class 4 hurricane (Bair, Elliott and Ruff, 1992) and the first named stonn of
the 1992 hurricane season, cut a 20 mile wide swath of destruction from the southeast to the
northwest across southern Florida. The National Weather Service had been tracking and reporting
the progress of Hurricane Andrew for about a week, and the National Hurricane Center predicted
the expected time and place of landfall with remarkable accuracy. However, forecasters failed
to anticipate the stonn' s severe intensity and its rapid speed over land. Prior to the landfall, a
mass evacuation, especially of those living in areas of potential stonn surge, was ordered by
officials throughout South Florida. The eye of the stonn moved directly over Homestead, FL and
the Everglades National Park. Most communities in the path were severely damaged.
Hurricane Andrew took a relatively low toll of lives but caused immensely high property costs.
Although rumors regarding migrant workers who might have perished could not be substantiated,
the number of those who died as a direct result of the stonn was around thirty persons. Damage
was spread over an area of more than 500 square miles, and the magnitude of the disaster was
initially difficult to assess. An estimated 100,000 homes were either destroyed or damaged by
wind and flying debris. There were no communication systems in the affected area. The entire
infrastructure originally existing in the storm's path ceased to function. Victims were without
shelter and power and experienced critical shortages of water, food and health supplies. A federal
disaster was declared almost immediately, but it was state, county and local organizations that
had to respond to the initial, overwhelming devastation. School openings were postponed until
September 14 to allow time for evacuees to move out of the schools used as emergency shelters
and for school roof and structural repairs to be completed. Storm debris hauled to landfills is
estimated to have been equivalent to the volume generated in 15 normal years of landfill
operations. Elections were postponed and held September 8. Rough early estimates of the total
damages from Hurricane Andrew in Florida and Louisiana is $20 billion. However, the figure
may eventually reach $30 billion. Hurricane Andrew is being considered the most costly natural
disaster in U.S. history.

FEDERAL DISASTER RESPONSE POLICIES
Hurricane Andrew proved that some of the basic assumptions and policies upon which federal
disaster response is planned are unrealistic. It is assumed that affected jurisdictions will be

capable of estimation of damages and that federal agencies will provide assistance and resources
only upon request. Neither Dade County nor the state of Florida was able to provide the needed
detailed assessment of damages. A Federal Disaster Field Office (DFO) was established in the
former Eastern Airlines terminal at Miami International Airport on the Thursday of the week of
the disaster. This DFOserved as the hub for most immediate disaster response activities. Federal,
state and local agencies and organizations coordinated their activities out of this headquarters.
The Red Cross and other volunteer agencies mobilized and brought their trained people to the
disaster area, but they were not able to provide immediate shelter and food needed for nearly a
quarter of a million people. A week after Andrew struck, tent cities were being set up for the
victims. Sixteen days into the disaster, 97,000 households were still without water and power,
and there was still no communication system. Evacuees who were trying to return to their
neighborhoods found landmarks and street signs destroyed to the extent that they had great
difficulty locating their devastated or non-existent homes and found no neighborhoods as such
at all. Eventually, 28,060 military personnel had to be deployed in the disaster zone to support
the Joint Task Force Andrew humanitarian relief operations.

ARRIVAL IN MIAMI
My research assistant, Nancy Winter, and I arrived in Miami on Sunday, September 7. We had
difficulty finding our hotel which was supposed to be located near the airport. After more than
an hour of searching and driving, we realized that the reason we could not fmd the place was
because the hotel's sign was missing; it had been blown off the building. This was a small lesson
for us in what emergency workers had to deal with when going into the disaster area where there
were not only missing building signs, but no street signs.

OUR RESEARCH FOCUS
Two questions were the focus of our research. 1) How were maps used by emergency personnel
and by the public during and after Hurricane Andrew? and 2) What kinds of maps were needed
during and after the disaster? Interviews were conducted with emergency personnel in the
Andrew Disaster Field Office and with hurricane victims in the communities of Goulds, Perrine
and Homestead. Results from this research include findings not only from our interviews but also
from our attendance at a meeting of key officials of the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(FEMA) Emergency Support Function of Planning and Information to which we were invited.

INTERVIEWS WITH THE VICTIMS
The media, but especially television, provided the only maps the interviewees considered during
this disaster. Victims interviewed did not employ any maps with which to evacuate. Most of them
owned no maps to use, nor did they even think about using maps. Those who evacuated went
to local institutions for shelter or drove to the homes of relatives. Despite the many warnings to
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evacuate broadcast by the National Weather Service, we found a surprising 50% of the people
we interviewed in the severely devastated areas did not evacuate during the stonn. Instead,
victims prayed, or secured the walls of their homes. This percentage is even lower than a New
York Times/CBS Poll taken in Dade County, Florida on September 12-14 in which 77% of those
interviewed said they did not evacuate during Hurricane Andrew (The New York Times,
September 20, 1992). Our interviews revealed that the majority of people found that they had to
leave after the stonn because of lack of electricity and severe damage to their houses. The pattern
of whether or not persons evacuated depended upon ownership of property. We found that nearly
90% of the homeowners we interviewed did not evacuate while in contrast those who rented
tended to evacuate. All our interviewees declared that they received plenty of warning before they
made evacuation decisions. The majority received warning infonnation from television; others
received phone calls from neighbors and friends. All respondents watched the progress of the
hurricane on television and kept up with weather bulletins issued by the National Weather
Service.
Interviews with emergency personnel, who were also victims, and who live in South Florida and
who experienced Hurricane Andrew revealed that it was a very fast moving hurricane with an
exceptionally nasty center and surprisingly reduced winds on the back side of the eye. A number
agreed that "the whole thing was over in 45 minutes" with the winds dropping to 70-80 miles
after the eye passed and the waves of rain afterwards abating rapidly and gone by noon that day.
This was unlike other historical Florida hurricanes such as Donna which took a slow, meandering
12 hours to cross overhead. The extreme devastation to structures from Hurricane Andrew was
attributed to exceptionally high winds at the eye. They were calculated to have been in excess
of 200 mph in some specific and restricted areas.

MAPS AVAILABLE TO EMERGENCY MANAGERS AND PERSONNEL
We began research at the Disaster Field Office in Miami. When we arrived, map resources were
scarce, and this lack of maps caused problems. Emergency workers complained about the overall
lack of available spatial data. Those not familiar with the area were practically lost without
effective maps to use. In one incident a group was assigned to a particular task within the disaster
area, but they drove around all day never locating the site. The only map available to them was
a Florida State Road Map. With most of the highway and exit signs blown away, these maps
were of limited use, especially because of their lack of detailed infonnation about cities and
towns.
Most federal and state agencies had some kind of crude crisis map on their office walls. Many
of these maps had been brought by individuals who were "map-oriented" or were Rand McNally
maps supplied at the DFO by Dade County. Pins and colored identifiers were used to show the
various resource centers that a particular agency or organization was responsible for. These were
maps that stayed stationary in the office and were used during decision making.
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Maps Provided by Dade County
Dade County not only provided all the maps at its disposal, but ordered more. One 20 year
veteran Dade County official, Assistant Director of the Department of Business and Economic
Development (DB ED) who lived in the impacted area, acted immediately after Andrew struck
to order all available State of Florida maps from Rand McNally. The company had nearly 5,000
copies in stock and immediately available. These maps were distributed to various agencies and
organizations at the DFO for them; to gain spatial knowledge of the overall disaster area. Most
agencies and organizations used these maps as basemaps upon which they added their own data,
making them invaluable crisis maps. Emergency personnel commenting on the Rand McNally
handouts maps admitted they were not ideal because they did not show enough detail, but they
pointed out that there were no other maps on hand. Emergency workers supplying aid in the field
were also given the Rand McNally maps even though they were limited in their effectiveness
because they did not show enough landmarks nor information for emergency managers unfamiliar
with the area yet dealing with a lack of street signs.
Dade County's Office of Computer Services and Information Systems (OCSIS) powered down
their computers before the storm to help prevent power surges which would affect the computer
system. The computers are located on the second floor above flood leveL On the third is a
Geographic Information System (GIS) which served an important function in the early response
stage of Hurricane Andrew. The initial damage assessment map titled Hurricane Andrew Severe
Areas South Dade County, Florida, and dated Sept. 2, 1993, was made through the application
of this GIS and became an indispensable crisis map. Produced by Metro-Dade, the information
on this map was collected by the local police then added into the county-wide GIS. This map was
updated as soon as more damage information became available. It was hand colored on the basis
of the aggregation of police reports. It was the first real damage report developed with any
systematized reliability. Although in essence subjective, the information came from a usually
reliable source, the police. Since they couldn't get into all areas because of the blowdown (and
such impenetrable areas became severity boundaries) and because the police helicopters had been
in a hanger that collapsed at Tamiami Airport so no police helicopters could be used, the police
had to make some assumptions in reporting the hurricane damages. Initially, this crisis map
showed the location of Distribution Centers, DMAT Field Units, Red Cross Service Centers,
FEMA Disaster Application Centers, Hurricane Shelters, Water Distribution Sites, Tent Areas,
Burn Sites, Kitchens, and Trash Sites. The same Dade County DBED official who had ordered
the Rand McNally maps took the initial version of this damage assessment map to a local printer
to have 3,000 copies made. They were distributed widely to agencies and organizations and were
found on most of the office walls in the DFO.
Two other very useful Dade County GIS map products produced in the wake of Hurricane
Andrew and in great demand after the disaster included a map of all public buildings in south
Dade County existing before the storm and a detailed road network map. Dade County also
provided maps already existing in their files including a series of population maps showing ethnic
distributions. These maps proved to be very useful to emergency managers since the disaster area
had a wide range of culturally diverse neighborhoods. Dade County landuse maps were also
4

available upon request.
Map and Photo Sources: County-State Coordination
The Assistant Director of the DBED also tapped state sources for aerial imagery of the disaster
area. At the state level, nine tapes of the Florida coast had been shot on August 24, 1992, by the
South Florida Water Management District. The six helicopters of this Water Management District
had flown along the coast to fIlm beach erosion, but they had also turned their cameras inland.
They knew from these photos that the total Hurricane damage was worse than they had originally
thought. The state had some SPOT satellite images to work with and had a Department of
Defense trained photo interpreter on their staff. The County DBED official was invited to go to
the state capital to investigate the state's imagery, but he was too busy at the DFO to take the
time off. A representative from the Governor's Liaison Office visited the DFO a couple of days
after the storm. He was making efforts to coordinate the state GIS because he was preparing a
paper for Congress on the use of GIS on the state level. He made available to the county DBED
official a damage assessment map produced by the state, but the county had to pay $55 to have
it sent by express mail. The County DB ED official explained: "They're dealing with different
problems than we are. Dade County is only 1/67th of their problem. They have a long-term
orientation; they know a disaster can happen in anyone of the other of Florida's 67 counties."

Photo Source: County-Federal Coordination
The Assistant Director of the DBED also made arrangements to secure a set of aerial photographs
from the federal government. After the storm, he talked to the Dade County Tax Assessor and
ascertained that the tax department's primary need was post-storm photos and maps in order to
establish damage assessments and to come up with estimates of the financial impacts. The DBED
official called the Pentagon and talked to people in the photo division about the possibility of
receiving some aerials of southern Florida. Two days later he received two sets of photos from
a company called Continental. However, there was a mixup, he received two of the same sets
while two copies of another set went to the Corps of Engineers. They discovered what had
happened two days later and exchanged sets. These photos came at three different scales:
1"=800'; 1"=400' and 1"=200". In all, the DBED official tried for three days to get photos from
the federal 'government He learned three things: 1) some photo work had been done; 2)
intelligence people had done some work to interpret these photos; and 3) it would take days or
weeks to get permission for him to access the data and materials at an unclassified level from
intelligence agencies.
Even though the Dade County DB ED official finally had both the South Florida Water
Management District images and a set of aerial photos obtained by Army Corp of Engineers'
overflights after the hurricane, these two sets of photographs could not be used by the County
for comparative purposes because no photo interpreters were available to make the assessments
at that point.
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TECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN RESPONSE

One of our major findings is the role Geographic Information Systems (GIS) played in producing
maps for coordination of Hurricane Andrew response and recovery efforts, a historic first. Two
weeks into the disaster, on Friday before our research team's arrival, Digital Matrix Service, Inc.
(DMS), a private firm located in Miami, volunteered to set up and staff, without cost for one
month, their GIS called InFoCad for use in the office dedicated to the Federal Emergency
Management Agency's (FEMA) Planning and Information Support Function. This private firm
realized immediately after Andrew struck that their digital database, which had been prepared for
a client and included every street from Palm Beach to the Keys, would be an invaluable resource
for FEMA. The firm (DMS) negotiated with the Washington office of FEMA and within 24
hours the Director of FEMA' s Information and Planning had accepted the offer and arranged to
have the Army Special Forces transport two workstations, an X-terminal and a pen plotter into
the Andrew Disaster Field Office.

In-House Mapping Capability Solves a Communication Gap
A critical communications problem was the first of many problems solved by the in-house
mapping capability of DMS. Many victims still stranded by the storm had no communication
with the outside world. The White House Task Force had arranged to have the Goodyear Blimp
stationed over the worst hit neighborhoods to furnish messages to victims. These were flashed
on the blimp in both Spanish and English. The problem was how to find the location of the
victims. Literally as soon as the DMS computers were plugged in at the DFO, an emergency
worker requested a map showing the coordinates of all of the neighborhoods in Homestead and
Florida City. The captain of the blimp used this coordinate map and his on-board global
positioning system equipment to find the location of the requested neighborhoods and flashed
information about aid, shelters, field kitchens and hospitals were conveyed to those in need.

The success of DMS in completing this first custom-made map was the start of a stream of
ongoing requests for specially prepared crisis maps needed by emergency managers in the DFO.
The DMS personnel expanded their mapping capability rapidly as the demand for mapping on
site increased.
-

Daily Update of the Database
Digital Matrix Service, Inc. updated its database- daily as requests for new maps grew. Decision
making by emergency managers was enhanced by the availability of maps showing the
distribution of a wide variety of services. Maps showing the distribution of these listed items
served important functions:
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Anny Kitchens
Red Cross Service Centers
Burn Sites
FEMA Disaster Application Centers
Health Centers
HRS Services

Hurricane Shelters
Medical Facilities
Tent Shelters
Trash-Transfer 'Sebns
Unemployment Centers
Portable Toilets

Map Types Used by Emergency Workers
Between September 6 and October 27, Digital Matrix Service, Inc. kept a daily log of the maps
requested. There were 633 requests for maps. Ninety-nine percent of the map requests were of
TYPE I data or point data, showing the site locations of a specific data set (see Table 1).

Table 1
TYPE I DATA
· Disaster Application Centers (DAC)
· American Red Cross Kitchens
· American Red Cross Warehouses
· American Red Cross Headquarters
· Metro Dade Burn Sites
· Unemployment Claims Offices
· American Red Cross Hurricane Shelters
· Disasters Medical Assistance Teams
· IRS Service Centers
· Trailer Parks
· Portable Toilets

· HRS Service Centers
· American Red Cross Service
Centers
· Metro Dade Trash Sites
· US Army Tent Shelters
· US Army Kitchens
· Community Health Centers
· MERS/MATIS
· Emergency Reception
Centers

Table 2
TYPE II DATA
· Building and Zoning Damage
· Contractor Zones
· Dunn and Brad Street Census Data
· FIRM Data
· FPL Siren Buffers
· Polling Locations
· Surge Contours
· Zip Code Zones

·
·
·
·
·
·
·
·
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Mortalities
Damage Assessments
Evacuation Zones
FPL Siren Locations
Hotel Locations
Voting Precincts
Surge Polygons
Hazardous Mitigation

Another 38% requested in addition to TYPE I data, TYPE II data or aerial data to be added to
the categories on the map (see Table II). More complex and time consuming from a production
perspective were maps that required Type III data; these maps required scanning, rectifying and
manipulation. However, 11% of the requests were for TYPE III data (Table 3).
Table 3

TYPE III DATA
. Scanned and rectified aerial photography provided by the Army Corp of Engineers
. Scanned and rectified USGS Topographic Quads

GIS as an Analytical Tool
After several days of operation, the value of the Geographic Information System was realized by
many emergency workers, and requests for analytical maps grew steadily. In one case, GIS
operators were asked to identify polling places for a rescheduled Primary Election which had
been postponed because of Andrew. The established database being employed by DMS facilitated
queries and analysis of the entire land area affected by the -storm. Identification of polling sites
was not an easy task considering that by law these places had to be a certain distance away from
any military activity. With over 28,000 military personnel in the area, this became a challenge.
GIS was successfully employed, and with the fIrst few challenges grew a need for more
analytical maps. In the end, 63% of the total number of maps produced by DMS required GIS
applications such as zooming into a land area for a specifIc need or GIS being applied as an
analytical tool.

Planning and Information Meeting: What is a GIS?
The head of the FEMA Planning and Information Emergency Support Function, Jack Bryan, had
developed an intellectual conviction and a vision that GIS applications can playa critical role in
information processing during disaster response and recovery. To further enhance information
flow and to educate those providing the 12 Emergency Support Functions in the Disaster Field
Office about the immediate effIcacy of GIS applications, he invited the key response agencies
to a meeting on September 9. The purpose of the meeting was to seek cooperation and
understanding about the need to coordinate all available existing resources for management of
the integration of various databases into the GIS being applied daily at the DFO. During the
meeting it became clear that the majority of key personal had little understanding about what a
GIS is or what it can do. One of the outcomes of the meeting was that GIS became in the case
of Hurricane Andrew a key teaching device and a spur to communication between different
agenCIes.
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The Problem of Shared Authority Over Data and Resources
At the September 9 meeting, official representatives from the major response agencies were asked
. to provide lists of their available data sources that were in digital form. It became obvious that
the Joint Task Force could provide much of the immediately needed data. The longest discussion
in the meeting centered on the issue of the need for a central authority to preside and provide
priorities for the sharing of and integration of data. While the Joint Task Force members were
willing to provide support and interpreted data, they were reluctant to share any raw data in
digital form with private agencies. Local and state agencies, on the other hand, shared their
digital data sources, and many private companies, intent on relieving the suffering of the
hurricane victims, shared their resources.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The lack of available maps during the response stage of any disaster can delay support for
victims and needed management responses. An historic and lucky circumstance occurred after
Hurricane Andrew. Through the involvement of private resources, the need for GIS support in
mapping for disaster response was highlighted. The work of Digital Matrix Service, Inc. clearly
demonstrated that by having a GIS-backed mapping capability available, the demand for crisis
mapping grew rapidly. The issue of the costs of supplying communities or counties in disaster
prone areas with hard"ware to provide GIS crisis mapping support in an emergency can be put
in perspective by this report. The Wall Street Journal reported that "the price of a unit of
processing power on a chip has fallen by half roughly every 18 month ever since the late 1960' s
invention of the microprocessors, which combine on one piece of silicon groups of circuits that
can be programmed." Funding for the collection of emergency data on a GIS to aid emergency
managers during a disaster and the hardware to apply GIS technology to crisis mapping during
a disaster should be on top of every planning list.

Evaluation of GIS's and Digital Data

•

Clearly, Geographic Information Systems in their current format pose problems. Still difficult to
operate unless run by technocrats, GISs need to be made more accessible and easier to operate
so they can be applied by any intelligent non-specialist. GISs also need to be able to integrate
different structured data-sources. There is a need to inventory existing GISs in order to identify
what GIS is most appropriate to be used in an emergency situation when managers are under
stress and time constraints. Maybe a new system easier to operate needs to be designed. The
system has to be self-contained. It should be able to run with the use of generators or batteries,
but still the system needs to be able to handle large datasets.
Another problem is the collection of data. An inventory of available digital data sources should
be conducted, and the resulting list should be compiled and published. There is a need for
standardizing sets. Finally, there is a problem of coordination of. existing data sources between
9

agencies. This might be eased by the establishment of a GIS library service that would provide
GIS data information and answer questions at all times. This service would be aware of any
digital data files on the federal and state and local level by regions.
Guidelines should be written after the evaluation of digital datasets, and their usefulness for
emergency managing should be evaluated. How often does the data need to be updated? Is the
scale appropriate? How much detail is needed? These are some of the questions that need to be
addressed.
Crisis mapping after Hurricane Andrew illustrated that timely research on perfecting a geographic
information system for providing mapping during a disaster should be a high priority item in
emergency management today.
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